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Whitening Miami:
Race, Housing, and Government Policy
in Twentieth-Century Dade County

by Raymond A. Mohl

Throughout the twentieth century, government agencies played a powerful role in creating and sustaining racially separate and segregated housing in Dade County, Florida. This pattern of housing segregation initially was imposed early through official policies of "racial zoning." During the New Deal era of the 1930s, federal housing policies were implemented at the local level to maintain racially segregated housing and neighborhoods. Such policies included the appraisal system established by the federal Home Owners Loan Corporation, which helped to create the discriminatory lending system known as "redlining." In addition, under the New Deal's federally sponsored public housing program, local housing authorities established segregated public housing projects. In the post-World War II years, old agendas for racial segregation continued to be carried out under still newer government programs, including the minority housing programs of the Housing and Home Finance Agency, the urban redevelopment and urban renewal programs of the federal housing acts of 1949 and 1954, and the vast interstate highway program. Local decision-making and implementation of all these programs perpetuated the racial segregation of Dade County neighborhoods and public housing projects.

The consequences of such government decision-making can be seen in the racial landscapes of Dade County at the end of the
Patterns of housing segregation—both in public housing projects and in neighborhoods generally—stem from the implementation of these racially motivated government policies over many decades. Documentary evidence drawn from government records and archives reveals a purposeful official effort to impose racial boundaries and to segregate African Americans residentially. This effort began quite early in Dade County’s history. In the early decades of the twentieth century, the City of Miami imposed a “color line,” limiting blacks residentially to a confined section of the city. When blacks tried to move across the racial line into white areas—as they did in 1911, 1915, and 1920—white violence erupted in an effort, as the Miami white press noted at the time, “to force the negroes back across the ‘color line.’”

By the 1930s, Dade County government had assumed responsibility for planning and zoning throughout the county, keeping existing policies of “racial zoning” in effect. Over many decades, a series of racially motivated public policy decisions on racial zoning, redlining, public housing, urban renewal, private housing developments for African Americans, and interstate expressway building effectually imposed residential segregation on the physical landscape of Dade County. In the early 1930s, most of Dade County’s black population of about thirty thousand was crowded into a fifty-block area—known at the time as “Colored Town” and today called “Overtown”—just northwest of the Miami business district. Racial zoning kept blacks confined residentially to Overtown and a few other small but segregated areas of Dade County. However, the local white civic elite wanted to expand the boundaries of Miami’s relatively small central business district. Overtown lay in the path of such expansion and thus became expendable in the thinking of local political and business leaders. A variety of plans and policies

1. Considerable discussion of the Miami “color line” can be found in the city's newspapers. See, for example, the Miami Herald, 21 May, 1,2,3 July 1920; Miami Metropolis, 30 June, 1, 2, 8 July 1920. For racial violence in early Miami stemming from blacks crossing the “color line,” see Paul George, “‘Colored Town’: Miami’s Black Community, 1896-1930,” Florida Historical Quarterly 56 (April 1978): 432-47, esp. 441-42; and idem, “Policing Miami’s Black Community, 1896-1930,” Florida Historical Quarterly 57 (April 1979): 434-50, esp. 438-40, 443. Miami’s early actions were not unique, as most southern cities imposed racial zoning, beginning with Baltimore in 1910; see Christopher Silver, “The Racial Origins of Zoning in American Cities,” in Urban Planning and the African American Community: In the Shadows, ed. June Manning Thomas and Marsha Ritzdorf (Thousand Oaks, Calif., 1997), 23-42.
were either implemented or attempted in order to move Overtown blacks out of the way.²

New Deal housing policies provided an unprecedented opportunity to achieve local racial goals. Miami's civic leaders, led by former county judge John C. Gramling, took advantage of the emerging New Deal ideology and successfully acquired federal funding for an exclusively African American public housing project. Eventually, in 1937, Liberty Square was completed, but it was located on Northwest 62nd Street, about five miles north of downtown Miami. Dade County's civic elite conceived of this housing project as the nucleus of a new black community that might siphon off the population of Overtown and permit downtown business expansion. Records of the Public Housing Administration, especially the many letters from John Gramling to federal officials, clearly suggest that promoters of the new housing project hoped to "remove the entire colored population" to the Liberty City area. Beyond the economic motivations, circumstances behind this first public housing project in Dade County reveal a racial agenda at work among local officials, who not only sought to maintain segregation but hoped to put greater physical distance between white and black areas of metropolitan Miami.³

From the beginning, federal policy encouraged the segregation of public housing projects through its "neighborhood composition guideline." According to a 1939 publication of the U.S. Housing Authority entitled Site Selection, the federal government clearly preferred racial segregation in public housing: "The aim of the [local housing] authority should be the preservation rather than the disruption of community social structures which best fit the desires of the groups concerned." White housing projects were to be located in white neighborhoods and black projects in black neighborhoods. In the South especially, federal housing officials were not willing to challenge local custom and law on matters of

³. John C. Gramling to Eugene H. Klaber, 19 February 1934, box 299, Records of the Public Housing Administration, Record Group 196, National Archives, Washington, D.C. Dozens of other Gramling letters to federal housing officials on the Liberty City housing project can be found in ibid., boxes 297-301.
Aerial view of the Liberty Square housing project, completed in 1937. This project was conceived as the nucleus of a new and distant black community outside the city limits. White property owners profited from the development of surrounding land. Courtesy of the Historical Association of Southern Florida, Miami.

race relations. Thus, segregated public housing in Dade County as carried out by the local government had the official sanction of federal housing agencies.4

In October 1936, as construction on the new Liberty Square housing project was underway, the Dade County Commission approved a twenty-year development strategy that included a “Negro resettlement plan.” The idea was to cooperate with the city of Miami “in removing [the] entire Central Negro town [Overtown] to three Negro Park locations, and establishment there of three model negro towns.” In the spring of 1937, the Dade County Plan-

ning Council fleshed out the details. One of the planned Negro communities was to be located on distant agricultural land on the Tamiami Trail at the western fringes of Dade County; the other black communities would be west of Perrine to the south and west of Opa-locka to the north. Each of these areas was at least fifteen miles from Overtown. But distance was not a problem, the Planning Board explained, since “an exclusive negro bus line service directly from these negro areas to the heart of Miami” would be established, permitting black workers to get to domestic and service jobs downtown. Promoters contemplated that those residing in existing black areas such as Overtown, Coconut Grove, and South Miami would “prefer, by reason of the advantages and attractiveness of these three large model areas, to sell out or move out from the present little and large slum sections, and that these present negro slum sections can give place gradually to the logical white development indicated by their geographical and other potentialities.” The Dade County Commission unanimously adopted the Planning Board report, and it was enthusiastically endorsed by the *Miami Herald*.5

About the same time, in May 1937, the chairman of the Dade County Planning Board, realtor George E. Merrick, emphasized the importance of the “negro resettlement plan.” In a speech before the Miami Board of Realtors, Merrick proposed “a complete slum clearance effectively removing every negro family from the present city limits.” This black removal, Merrick asserted, was “a most essential fundamental” for the achievement of ambitious goals the planning board laid out for Miami and Dade County.6

The idea of black removal to make room for white neighborhoods and downtown development persisted for decades. In April 1945, the Dade County Commission was still discussing the creation of “the finest model negro community in the United States,” as well as the improvement and planned expansion of exclusively black residential areas in Liberty City, Coconut Grove, and Browns-


ville. Slum clearance plans in 1946 called for the forced removal of Miami blacks from downtown to a distant new housing development west of Liberty City. A Dade County Planning Board Survey of Negro Areas (1952) noted that "with adequate space and housing being provided in other negro areas, this slum [Overtown] will soon be eliminated." As late as 1961, the Miami Herald reported on new plans to eliminate Overtown to facilitate downtown business expansion.

Although these plans for black resettlement were never implemented, they are historically important for at least two reasons. First, they reveal the racial thinking of white civic leaders on housing issues, and the lengths to which they were willing to go to achieve their goals. Second, they provide insight into the purposes of subsequent policies and plans that Dade County ultimately implemented. Indeed, the underlying goals of these early plans were eventually achieved by the white leadership in Dade County through other policies. In particular, starting in the 1950s, Dade County—often with the cooperation and support of federal officials—began to implement policies regarding public housing, urban redevelopment, and interstate expressway construction that destroyed inner-city housing and ultimately forced African Americans from Overtown into new racially segregated areas of Dade County.

Local and federal officials worked together to segregate whites and blacks through redlining. A new federal agency established in 1933, the Home Owners Loan Corporation was designed to grant

7. Dade County Commission Minutes, 3 April 1945, microfilm, Florida Room, Miami-Dade Public Library, Miami; Miami Herald, 5 April 1945. The National Urban League surveyed the Dade County black community in 1943. It reported the following on black housing: "The residential areas occupied by this group are strictly defined both in the county and in the city. In both places zoning regulations restrict Negro residents. . . . The City of Miami and Dade County have both been concerned with eradicating slum conditions in areas where these people live, but the plans which have been formulated to provide housing for Negroes aim at moving them far from their city areas and far from the center of the city"; National Urban League, A Review of Economic and Cultural Problems in Dade County, Florida As They Relate to Conditions in the Negro Population (New York, 1943), 99-100.

long-term, low-interest mortgages to homeowners who could not secure regular mortgages or who were in danger of losing their homes through default or foreclosure. The HOLC developed an elaborate appraisal and rating system by which to evaluate neighborhoods in most cities and urban areas, and thus determine the risks involved in granting HOLC mortgage funds. HOLC appraisal committees—usually composed of local bankers and real estate men—surveyed urban neighborhoods in hundreds of American cities, assigning each neighborhood to one of four categories from the most desirable (A areas) through the least desirable (D areas). These appraisal decisions were plotted on “residential security maps,” on which the four categories were color-coded—green for the A areas, blue for the B, yellow for the C, and red for the D. These maps, the HOLC noted, “graphically reflect the trend of desirability in neighborhoods from a residential viewpoint.” Since these appraisal categories were widely adopted by the private banking and mortgage industry, the HOLC actually initiated the practice of “redlining,” by which banks and other lending institutions refused to grant mortgages and other loans in older, poorer, and minority neighborhoods.

In Dade County, local HOLC appraisers made residential surveys in 1936 and 1938. The residential security maps they prepared and the accompanying documentary material reflect the widespread racial biases common at the time. Those areas of Dade County in which African Americans resided, as well as nearby white areas, received the lowest HOLC ratings. Only a few wealthy areas of Miami, Miami Beach, and Coral Gables received top A or B ratings. The 1938 HOLC map of Dade County reveals a smattering of green and blue and a vast expanse of yellow and red covering the entire metropolitan area. What is most striking about this HOLC map is the fact that extensive areas of undeveloped land in the northwest quadrant of the county were given a D rating. There can be only one explanation for the decision to assign the lowest D rating to an area that as yet had no particular character: the fact that Dade County was building the Liberty Square public housing project for African Americans in that area and intended African

Americans to move to that part of the county. Thus, by 1938, for all practical purposes, Dade County had been redlined along racial lines by the local real estate and banking community with the aid of the federal government’s appraisal system.

One cannot underestimate the impact of these racially motivated redlining decisions on the physical and economic development of black neighborhoods in Dade County. The Miami appraisers of the HOLC were plainly aware of the hesitancy of banks and mortgage lenders to invest in C and D neighborhoods. Mortgage money for home purchase or building generally was described as “ample” in A and even in some B areas. But in the C areas mortgage funds were “limited”; and for D neighborhoods, a single word described the availability of mortgage money from local institutions—none.

The HOLC appraisers were so concerned about race that they gave low ratings even to those white neighborhoods where, over time, blacks were expected to move. In white, working-class Shadowlawn, for instance, mortgage money was “limited,” even though the neighborhood was “close to good transportation and schools and shopping centers” and despite the fact that sections were “being improved with houses too good for the area.” In the judgment of HOLC appraisers, the “trend of desirability” of Shadowlawn over the next ten to fifteen years was “down.” Banks and other lending institutions remained reluctant to invest in Shadowlawn and other C neighborhoods, even though their populations at the time were entirely white. According to the HOLC, these areas were in the process of “transition”—real estate code suggesting that they were adjacent to black neighborhoods and that they might soon be less white than black.

The impact of the HOLC in Dade County was to consign black residential areas, as well as adjacent white areas which might become black neighborhoods, to a future of physical decay and intensified racial segregation. Several sociological studies between 1956


12. Ibid.
and 1975 demonstrated that of more than one hundred large American cities, Miami/Dade County had the highest degree of residential segregation by race in 1940, 1950, and 1960. This was not an incidental outcome.13

The real damage began when the HOLC appraisal system very quickly came to be used by private financial institutions and eventually the Federal Housing Administration and the Veterans Administration in evaluating mortgage and loan applicants. Few blacks in Miami or elsewhere were able to obtain FHA mortgage assistance.14 The FHA’s Underwriting Manual, first published in 1938 and reissued in 1947, opposed neighborhood “invasion by incompatible racial and social groups” and advocated residential segregation as a means of maintaining community stability. The FHA, as housing scholar Charles Abrams noted in his book Forbidden Neighbors, sought to “set itself up as the protector of the all-white neigh-

14. Elizabeth L. Virrick, “New Housing for Negroes in Dade County, Florida,” in Studies in Housing and Minority Groups, ed. Nathan Glazer and Davis McEntire (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960), 135-43, esp. 140; Edward T. Graham, “A Brief of Conditions Surrounding the Housing Problem in Miami As It Relates to the Negro,” Statement at Hearings of Federal Committee on Housing, Miami, 27 October 1947, typescript, National Urban League Papers, Part I, Series 3, box 57, Library of Congress. A black preacher and head of Miami’s Negro Service Council (predecessor of the local branch of the National Urban League), Graham stated that “Until the present year, it is believed that Miami had made something close to a record in the granting of F.H.A. benefits to Negroes. Up to 1947 only one loan for home building had been granted”; ibid., 4. This point was confirmed by Frank S. Horne, administrator of the Racial Relations Service of the federal Housing and Home Finance Agency; see Frank S. Horne to Albert M. Cole, 3 April 1953, Records of the Housing and Home Finance Agency, Record Group 205, box 750, National Archives. Horne wrote: “When I first went to Miami several years ago in collaboration with the FHA program, there had been only one family among the entire Negro population (40,000) who had been able to receive FHA mortgage insurance.” According to one scholarly study of nationwide housing patterns, “only 2 percent of all FHA-insured loans were awarded to blacks from the mid-1940s through 1960”; see Charles M. Lamb, “Equal Housing Opportunity,” in Implementation of Civil Rights Policy, ed. Charles S. Bullock III and Charles M. Lamb (Monterey, Calif., 1984), 148-83, quotation on 159.
borhood” and “became the vanguard of white supremacy and racial purity—in the North as well as the South.”

Moreover, through its Planning Board (later the Planning and Zoning Board), Dade County used the HOLC appraisal and mapping system in guiding decisions for future black residential expansion. As the board began a “controlled” expansion of black residential growth in the late 1930s and 1940s, that growth was concentrated in the areas already redlined as less desirable by the HOLC appraisers.

Joint early efforts of the federal government and Dade County to redline metropolitan Miami continue to have a profound effect on Dade County at the end of the twentieth century. A 1987 Dade County map showing projected black residential areas in 1990 matches almost exactly the 1938 HOLC map showing redlined areas of the County. These two maps, half a century apart, offer clear evidence of the connection between designs to impose racial segregation in Dade County and the racial conditions in the 1990s. The ghettoization of blacks in northwest Dade County by the 1990s was virtually predetermined by the decision to redline that part of the county in the 1930s. Thus, the HOLC appraisal system and its local implementation in Dade County left a legacy of intensified racial segregation that has persisted to the present time.


Racial zoning had been outlawed by the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of *Buchanan v. Warley* (1917). As late as the 1940s and 1950s, however, officially sanctioned racial zoning persisted in Dade County. Like so many southern cities and counties, Miami established planning commissions and hired professional planners to develop comprehensive urban plans that in various ways incorporated rigid racial separation of residential areas. The practice became especially controversial in the late 1940s.\(^\text{17}\)

By that decade, the hemmed-in black neighborhoods of Dade County were bursting at the seams. Black population increases overwhelmed available housing. One local realtor, Wesley E. Garrison, saw opportunity and began buying up houses and empty lots in the all-white Brownsville neighborhood, not far from Overtown. Garrison was a "blockbuster," in real estate parlance. He began selling houses in Brownsville to black buyers willing to cross the so-called "red line" in violation of Dade County zoning ordinances. The Ku Klux Klan responded with demonstrations and cross burnings, but black buyers remained undeterred.\(^\text{18}\).

Garrison's real estate practices challenged racial zoning, eliciting stiff opposition from local government agencies. In 1946, two black men who bought Garrison houses were harassed by the Dade County Zoning Board, the Dade County Health Department, and the Dade County Sheriff's Office. Eventually, they were jailed for violating several local zoning regulations. Garrison went to court to defend his black clients and to challenge the racial zoning ordinance. A Florida circuit judge determined that Dade County did not have power to enforce racial zoning, upholding the right of African Americans to purchase homes anywhere in the county. County commissioners appealed to the Florida Supreme Court,

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which eventually declared the Dade County racial zoning ordinance unconstitutional.¹⁹

Despite the ruling, Dade County continued to pursue racially motivated housing policies. Slum clearance in Miami’s inner city area remained a primary goal; the provision of new black residential space in outlying areas was also an urgent matter.²⁰ Consequently, a newly reorganized Dade County Regional Planning Board began mapping out future black housing in undeveloped northwest Dade County, the area redlined by the HOLC ten years earlier. The board also considered ideas for privately financed black housing through the Federal Housing Administration and later the Racial Relations Service of the Housing and Home Finance Agency, whose assistance was needed to provide mortgage insurance. Despite the unconstitutionality of racial zoning, the board moved forward, as Dade County Attorney Fred W. Cason explained to the *Miami Herald* in December 1946, with “an ‘understanding’ that the designated tracts are for negroes.”²¹

Throughout the early 1940s, racially based zoning decisions peppered the minutes of the Dade County Commission. On September 16, 1941, commissioners approved a Zoning Board recommendation that a tract of land in Goulds, an agricultural community south of Miami, “be segregated and set aside for colored occupancy,” a decision supposedly in “the best interest of the community.”²² On March 9, 1943, the commission approved a resolution that “segregated and set aside for negro occupancy” a tract of land near Homestead in southern Dade County. The zoning director was “authorized to issue permits to negroes for building and use on said property.” The commission also reported that “since

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¹⁹. The details of the harassment of the two African American home buyers and the subsequent legal challenge to racial zoning can be followed in newspaper reportage in the *Pittsburgh Courier*. This newspaper was widely read nationally by African Americans. It published a Florida edition and based a correspondent, John A. Diaz, in Miami who reported weekly on Florida news of interest to black readers. The *Pittsburgh Courier* reportage is significant for historical researchers on Dade County because the Miami black newspaper, *The Miami Times*, has not survived prior to 1948 and because black issues were not extensively covered in the white press before the Civil Rights movement of the 1950s. See *Pittsburgh Courier*, 11 August, 17 November, 1 December 1945, 16 February, 23 February, 2 March, 30 March, 20 April, 11 May 1946. The Florida Supreme Court outlawed racial zoning in *State of Florida v. Wright*, 25 So. 2nd 86 (1946).

²⁰. Dade County Commission Minutes, 3 April 1945.


²². Dade County Commission Minutes, 16 September 1941.
this property adjoins other property owned and occupied by negroes, such use would not be detrimental to the area in question.”23

A month later, white residents complained that realtor Wesley Garrison was proposing a “negro residential settlement” in their Brownsville neighborhood. The Dade County Commission resolved to “make every possible effort to maintain the present County zoning regulations governing the area involved.” On December 29, 1943, the commission designated two areas of Opa-locka known as Bunche Park and Magnolia Gardens to be “set aside for negro occupancy.” On February 22, 1944, the commission approved a resolution establishing a boundary line “dividing White and Colored residents, in the town of Goulds, Florida.” Three months later, the commission voted to change the zoning of an agricultural area of Opa-locka, declaring it “open to Negro occupancy.” However, the Commission also stipulated that a planted “buffer strip at least sixty feet in width” be established along the eastern border of the property, walling off the new black residential area from nearby white commercial and residential property. Subsequently, Opa-locka experienced a rapidly rising black population in the years after World War II.24

All of these decisions culminated in an August 1945 zoning resolution that made manifest the commission’s segregationist designs:

Whereas, this Board has heretofore approved zone maps of the unincorporated areas of Dade County, with lines or other markings to indicate the zones for White and Colored occupancy; and Whereas, it is the opinion of this Board that people of the White race should not be permitted to encroach upon the areas which have been designated for Negro occupancy, nor should Negro Occupancy be extended into areas heretofore designated for White occupancy; and Whereas the Federal Government, has set definite rules and regulations, drawing definite lines of separation between the races, as is evidenced by government requirements in the management of various housing projects, throughout the South, permitting only White people to live in White housing projects, and only Negroses

23. Ibid., 9 March 1943.
24. Ibid., 27 April, 29 December 1943, 22 February, 23 May 1944.
to live in buildings erected for the Colored race. Now therefore be it resolved, by the Board of Commissioners of Dade County, Florida, that boundaries heretofore approved by this Board, or as the same shall be hereafter amended or altered, shall constitute the dividing line between the White and Colored people in Dade County, Florida.

Referring to the policies of the federal housing agencies, the commission justified racial segregation in Dade County.25

Ironically, the commission also used the illegality of racial zoning as an excuse to deny some individuals or groups the racial zoning changes they sought. For instance, on July 14, 1938, the Dade County Commission rejected several petitions to zone separate properties for black residence, noting in its minutes that the Zoning Board and the County Commission “had no legal right to designate any property or zone any property for negro purposes.”26 As late as 1951, five years after the Florida Supreme Court had ruled against racial zoning, the Dade County Planning Board and the Dade County Commission were still operating on the principle that “expansion of existing negro areas and the further designation of new areas for negro occupancy should be only on a ‘controlled’ basis.”27

The Dade County Commission’s determination to maintain racial segregation, even if through de facto zoning policies, was possible only because federal guidelines permitted and even encouraged racial segregation. For instance, the U.S. Housing Authority distributed a “neighborhood composition guideline” sanctioning segregation in the late 1930s. A remarkable 1944 federal housing document, “Special Note on Site Selection,” recommended black projects in black neighborhoods and white projects

25. Ibid., 14 August 1945. This resolution also referred to zoning maps prepared by Dade County to delineate white and black areas. All of the previously cited Dade County Commission resolutions were followed by instructions to the county zoning director to make necessary alterations to official zoning maps of the County. Such maps, dozens of them, still exist, with official racial “redlines” clearly demarked. They are located in the files of the Dade County Building and Zoning Department, Miami-Dade County Government Center, Miami.


in white neighborhoods. If a project were to have mixed occupancy, "the effort was always to locate the project in or adjacent to a traditional Negro neighborhood. . . . The result was, in effect, to maintain the racial groups in the same specific or general areas in which they were living, and in many instances to intensify the separation of these groups."28

Thus, federal housing policy enabled southern housing authorities to maintain "local custom" on matters of race. Not until the civil rights movement gained momentum did pressures change official federal policy. In November 1962, President John F. Kennedy issued an executive order banning racial discrimination in public housing. Still, Kennedy's order only banned segregation in future public housing projects, not in existing ones. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 banned racial discrimination in site and tenant selection, but implementation seemed slow in Dade County as it did elsewhere. As late as 1967, according to internal U.S. HUD memoranda, local housing authorities were still using a variety of justifications to maintain racial segregation in public housing site and tenant selection. The next year, Haley Sofge, Director of the Dade County Department of Housing and Urban Development, admitted that "the older Negro [public housing] developments . . . remain segregated." HUD official John J. Knapp acknowledged the problem in a 1985 statement to the U.S. House Subcommittee on Housing and Community Development: "By the mid-1960s, it had become evident that much of the public housing available to minorities was being constructed in areas of minority concentration."29

Both federal and local experience with redlining and racial zoning assured that housing built in these neighborhoods would

28. Site Selection, 7-11; "Special Note on Site Selection," 20 May 1944, 1-4, Adker Case File 068049LC.
take on the racial character of the neighborhoods. Liberty Square, completed in 1937, was entirely black. The Edison Courts project, opened in 1939 and only eight blocks east of Liberty Square on NW 62nd Street, was completely white. More public housing would not be built for fifteen years, primarily because of powerful opposition from the private real estate industry, which tapped into McCarthyism to portray public housing as “socialistic.” In 1954, the Miami Housing Authority completed a new public housing project for blacks, the James E. Scott Homes project located in a racially zoned area called Para Villa Heights, several blocks north and west of Liberty Square.

Committed to racial segregation, the Miami Housing Authority controlled Dade County’s public housing until 1968. Yet, MHA had to get approval for public housing sites from the Dade County Planning Board and the Dade County Commission. Thus, Dade County had ultimate control over public housing site selection and used this authority to maintain segregated housing patterns, approving new public housing projects—even those where whites initially lived—only if located in existing black areas or in the path of black residential expansion. The white Edison Courts project, for instance, was situated on the fringes of an expanding ghetto redlined under the HOLC appraisal system. The Victory Homes project, initially built in 1941 as war housing for white military officers and later turned over the MHA, was sited on the margins of Liberty City in an area already redlined by the HOLC. Two other white projects—Little River Terrace (1958) and Larchmont Gar-

Second ghetto apartment bombing in 1951. When owners of the Knight Manor Apartments began moving blacks into the white housing complex not far from Liberty City, the Ku Klux Klan responded with dynamite attacks on three separate occasions. Courtesy of the Florida State Archives, Tallahassee.

dens (1959)—sprouted in transitional territory, that is, urban space that had been redlined by HOLC appraisers two decades earlier. By 1993, black occupancy in the five pre-1960 housing projects ranged from 94 percent to 100 percent.

The Dade County Commission made numerous decisions in the 1950s regarding public housing site selection, which also had important consequences for the racial make-up of public housing. In February 1951, for instance, in a discussion on a proposed public housing site in all-white Hialeah, the Dade County Commission decided instead that there was sufficient land available in Brownsville, Liberty City, and the “Central Negro Area” [Overtown], and

that any new black public housing projects should be located in those areas. On several occasions in 1952, 1953, and 1955, the Dade County Commission approved zoning changes to permit construction of black public housing projects in the Liberty City area or on the white fringes of that rapidly expanding black ghetto. These projects became the James E. Scott Homes (black), Little River Terrace (white), and Larchmont Gardens (white).5

Additional changes were made in Dade County public housing policy in the 1960s. These included special projects for the elderly (some for whites and others for blacks), small scattered-site projects, and “turnkey” projects in which private developers built housing and then turned it over to Dade County HUD.36 However, a HUD map from the 1970s showing the location of public housing projects reveals that most of these newer housing projects were located in areas that currently correspond with completely segregated black residential areas.37

While Dade County maintained racial segregation by controlling the location of public housing projects, it also used its planning and zoning powers in shaping the private housing market for African Americans. Advocating slum clearance and the elimination of “blighted” housing, the county commission simultaneously confined new privately built black housing to areas already racially zoned for blacks. A 1952 Dade County Planning Board report, entitled Survey of Negro Areas, made clear the commission’s interest in keeping racially segregated housing, even as the black population of the county grew dramatically in the postwar era. The Survey pointed out that a great deal of land—some 2,191 acres in all—remained undeveloped in districts already designated or racially zoned for blacks, leaving “three-fifths of the colored land unoccupied and available to them for building.” Consequently, the Survey concluded, “no new expansion of existing areas nor new areas for colored occupancy should be made available until the existing vacant land is utilized.” Well into the 1950s, standard government

housing policy in Dade County was to keep blacks hemmed in officially designated and already segregated areas of the county.38

Consequently, both to provide new housing and to maintain racial segregation, Dade County planners and county commissioners carried out their intentions to fill in “unoccupied colored land.” When the Planning Board reported on black housing on April 3, 1945, they recommended that existing black districts in Miami, Coconut Grove, Brownsville, and Liberty City “be replanned to the limit of their present area capacity thus providing additional housing space for 26,000 [black] persons.”39 Their suggestion was fully implemented. In 1962, when the Greater Miami Urban League surveyed the condition of blacks in Dade County, investigator James W. Morrison reported that “a strict pattern of intense residential segregation of Negroes has been established; the expansion of residential areas available to the Negro group has occurred only in places contiguous to previously existing residences.”40

Much of this development took the form of large, privately built apartment house projects. These two- and three-story apartments, sometimes called “concrete monsters” by local housing reformers, replaced the torn-down “shotgun” houses that had lined many Overtown streets, or they went up on undeveloped land in Brownsville, Liberty City, and Opa-locka. In the politically reactionary late 1940s and early 1950s, when public officials were reluctant to build new public housing, the apartments built by land speculators and developers accommodated a large portion of Dade County’s rising black population. Still, the Dade County Commission exerted influence over the racial segregation of private housing, impressing on developers in 1951 “that in these areas [Brownsville, Liberty City, and Overtown] there are available vacant properties which are closer in to the Central Miami District, and that these should first be developed before more distant and

outlying areas [are] started.”\(^4\) In the postwar era, Dade County planners and commissioners pursued a consistent policy of maintaining housing segregation, even as blacks relocated from Overtown to newer “second ghetto” areas.\(^2\)

And their designs were reinforced by federal housing policies. In 1947, several separate housing agencies (Federal Housing Administration, Public Housing Administration, Urban Renewal Administration, and Federal Home Loan Bank Board) were consolidated into a new agency, the Housing and Home Finance Agency.\(^3\) Incorporated within HHFA was the Racial Relations Service, originally created in 1938 as a branch of the U.S. Housing Authority to provide advice on racial issues to federal and local housing authorities.\(^4\) In the 1940s and early 1950s, the Racial Relations Service was headed by Frank S. Horne, an early member of President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “Black Cabinet” and uncle of singer-actress Lena Horne. Horne committed to integrated housing, but postwar political realities made those goals problematic. Consequently, Horne and his race relations advisors generally took a less aggressive position, pushing for badly needed new black housing even if it was segregated. Still, Horne kept advocating internally for the liberalization and ultimate desegregation of federal housing policy. As a result, by the mid-1950s, Horne would be fired and the Racial Relations Service partially dismantled.\(^5\)

In opposition to Horne stood Albert M. Cole, President Eisenhower’s appointee as head of HHFA in 1953. For the rest of the de-

\(^41\). Dade County Commission Minutes, 6 February, 26 April 1951; Dade County Planning Board, Survey of Negro Areas, 1949-1951, 73-76.


\(^43\). Richard O. Davies, Housing Reform During the Truman Administration (Columbia, Mo., 1966), 62-64; Hirsch, “’Containment’ on the Home Front,” 158-61.

\(^44\). Nathan Straus, “Establishment and Responsibilities of the Office of Racial Relations,” 11 March 1939, Memorandum, U.S. Housing Authority, Adker Case File 115918LC.

cade, Cole pursued a pro-segregationist policy in housing, seeking to use residential containment of blacks to maintain school segregation, which had been outlawed by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1954.46

Pro-segregationist federal housing policies and the weakness of HHFA’s Racial Relations Service contributed to the perpetuation of Dade County’s residential segregation. Horne and regional HHFA race relations officers worked with Dade County officials and private developers to expand the housing market for African Americans, but on a segregated basis only. For instance, in December 1949, Horne wrote to Julius A. Thomas of the National Urban League that “I have been very interested in furthering efforts to get privately financed housing open to Negroes developed in Miami and other areas of the State of Florida.”47

Most often, HHFA race relations officials had difficulty persuading Dade County commissioners to open up new sites for black housing. In one case, in the late 1940s, they successfully assisted in the development of Richmond Heights, a middle-class, single-family black housing development located about fifteen miles south of downtown Miami.48 Liberals in the Racial Relations Service found it necessary to comply with the segregationist principles of higher level federal housing officials like Cole if they were to expand housing opportunities for African Americans.

By the late 1950s, the federal interstate highway program provided a new opportunity for Dade County officials to reorganize racial space. Early plans going back to the 1930s to eliminate Overtown

and move all the blacks outside the Miami city limits remained unfulfilled by the mid-1950s. Liberty City had indeed become the nucleus of a new black community, as Miami and Dade County leaders anticipated in the 1930s, but Overtown remained, undergoing transformation in the 1950s with the rise of the “concrete monsters.” When launched in 1956, the interstate highway program promised to revive Miami’s languishing central business district and permit future expansion and redevelopment. Dade County leaders anticipated further removal of blacks from Overtown as inner-city expressways ripped through the community into downtown Miami.49

Throughout urban America, interstate highways were built through urban centers, destroying wide swaths of constructed landscape and uprooting entire communities. Local officials quickly recognized how to use highway construction to eliminate “blighted” neighborhoods and to redevelop or “reconvert” valuable inner-city land. In most big cities, the forced relocation of blacks and other low-income urbanites intensified the spatial reorganization of residential neighborhoods that had been underway since the end of World War II. This process produced newer “second” ghettos in formerly white sections or in unbuilt fringe areas of metropolitan regions.50

The construction of Interstate 95 in Dade County provides a powerful example of racially motivated decision-making with long-term consequences. As early as 1956, the Florida State Road Department, in conjunction with the Dade County Commission and local business leaders, routed Interstate 95 directly through Overtown and into downtown Miami. Alternative plans using an abandoned Florida East Coast Railroad corridor were rejected in anticipation that, as highway planners noted, the Overtown route would provide “ample room for the future expansion of the central business district in a westerly direction.” Commissioners and planners tapped into the long campaign dating back to the 1930s of moving all blacks out of Overtown.51

49. Mohl, “Race and Space in the Modern City,” 100-58.
Consequently, when the downtown leg of the expressway was completed in the mid-1960s, it ripped through the center of Overtown, wiping out black residential and business areas, the commer-
Distribution of African American neighborhoods in Dade County, 1951. Black communities were spread throughout metropolitan Miami, but the outlines of second ghetto development can be seen in northwest Dade, anchored by the growing black communities of Brownsville, Liberty City, and Opa-Locka. From Reinhold P. Wolff and David K. Gillogly, Negro Housing in the Miami Area (Coral Gables, Fla., 1951).

cial and cultural heart of black Miami. One massive expressway interchange alone (I-95 and I-395) took up twenty square blocks of densely settled land and destroyed the housing of about ten thou-
Distribution of African American neighborhoods in Dade County, 1990. Fifty years of government housing policies and second ghetto development resulted in the heavy residential concentration of blacks in northwest Dade County. Courtesy of Metro Dade County Planning Department, Miami.

sand people. Reflecting on Miami’s interstate experience at a 1971 transportation planning seminar, black political leader Athalie Range angrily stated:
The Greater Miami area is a classic example of the transportation planners’ disregard of the inner-city populace. After conducting not one single public hearing in the Central District of the City of Miami, 5000 housing units were destroyed between 1960 and 1969 in the all-black downtown area of Miami to make room for the North-South Expressway. . . . The result is that new slums were immediately created by demolition of 5000 units of low-cost housing in one area, forcing 12,000 people into a crowded housing market with virtually no new low- or moderate-income housing vacancies. Poor families, blocked by racial discrimination from moving to new areas were forced into existing ghettos creating a higher density and incredible overcrowding of large families into one-bedroom apartments.

In frustration, Range regretted that Dade County transportation experts planned still more expressways “and as usual they were in low-income neighborhoods.” The construction of Interstate 95 and other expressways through downtown Miami virtually destroyed Overtown as a viable community. Only eight thousand of forty thousand blacks who made that neighborhood home before interstate construction now remain in the new urban wasteland.52

Since the late 1950s, slum clearance and urban renewal have facilitated further expansion of Miami’s central business district into the formerly vibrant Overtown community. City, county, and federal office buildings and parking lots have gobbled up considerable space. More recent projects for upscale apartments and shopping centers and a sports arena resulted in the further destruction of Overtown. By the end of the era of expressway building and urban redevelopment, little remained of Overtown to recall its days as a thriving center of black community life.53


For the most part, blacks uprooted from the Overtown expressway route ended up in Liberty City and more distant communities such as Opa-locka and Carol City in northwest Dade County.\textsuperscript{54} By 1990, according to Dade County population maps, the entire northwest quadrant of the county had become primarily black. The plans of those who carried out racial zoning in the 1930s and 1940s had come to fruition.\textsuperscript{55}

Author's Note: This article is a revised version of an expert witness report submitted in the case of Ann-Marie Adker et al., Plaintiffs, v. The United States Department of Housing and Urban Development and Metro-Dade County, Case No. 87-0874-CIV-PAINE. The Adker case began in 1987 when several black residents of Dade County public housing filed a civil rights class action lawsuit in U.S. District Court, charging that discriminatory policies had restricted blacks to blighted housing projects while non-blacks were directed to more desirable Section-8 housing. These practices, it was alleged, perpetuated racial segregation and the racial isolation of blacks in Dade County. After more than a decade of legal wrangling, Dade County and federal housing officials settled with the plaintiffs in June 1998. According to the multi-million dollar settlement, Section-8 housing would be opened up to blacks, and Dade County would make special efforts to desegregate predominantly black public housing projects. The purpose of this expert witness report was to document in some detail the long-term housing policies of Dade County and federal agencies that first created and then perpetuated racial segregation in public housing and in residential patterns generally.

\textsuperscript{54} Mohl, "Making the Second Ghetto in Metropolitan Miami," 395-427; Teresa Van Dyke, "Miami's Second Ghetto" (M.A. thesis, Florida Atlantic University, 1994).